R&AW: Aligning Propensity with Modern Tradecraft Realities

R&AW, India's external intelligence agency is at a crossroads. The prolonged struggle, escalating over a year and culminating in what many view as an ambush, has placed the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), under intense scrutiny. Observers are questioning R&AW’s tradecraft, casting doubt on the operational finesse expected of an agency tasked with safeguarding national interests. But the criticism surrounding R&AW’s methods only tells part of the story. Tradecraft alone doesn’t define an intelligence agency's success; its effectiveness also hinges on the strategic outlook and instinctive actions taken in response to evolving global threats.

From Collective Intelligence to Strategic Offensive

R&AW grew from a foundation influenced by British intelligence objectives during post-Independence India. Initially, intelligence operations centered around broad, collective goals, with the British using the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to track Soviet activity. This phase, marked by the presence of MI6 officials guiding intelligence flows, set a unique tone for India’s intelligence culture. However, R&AW’s establishment in 1968 signaled a shift, exemplified by its decisive role in the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, marking the agency’s early promise.

As turmoil intensified in Kashmir and insurgencies plagued Punjab, R&AW evolved, strategically expanding its network and taking measured offensive stances in the region. The establishment of CIT-X units, later dissolved under the I.K. Gujral government, showcased a brief era where R&AW experimented with more assertive methods. Yet, R&AW’s approach largely remained one of “soft neutralisation” — expanding its regional footprint through influence and exposure, rather than aggression. A notable instance was its operations in Bangladesh during the military regime of Ershad, a pro-Pakistan leader, where R&AW adeptly maneuvered to maintain influence without overtly hostile actions.

However, successive intelligence lapses — from Kargil in 1999 to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks — exposed the limitations of R&AW’s traditional, bureaucratically hampered framework. These incidents unve

R&AW, India's external intelligence agency is at a crossroads. The prolonged struggle, escalating over a year and culminating in what many view as an ambush, has placed the Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW), under intense scrutiny. Observers are questioning R&AW’s tradecraft, casting doubt on the operational finesse expected of an agency tasked with safeguarding national interests. But the criticism surrounding R&AW’s methods only tells part of the story. Tradecraft alone doesn’t define an intelligence agency's success; its effectiveness also hinges on the strategic outlook and instinctive actions taken in response to evolving global threats.

From Collective Intelligence to Strategic Offensive

R&AW grew from a foundation influenced by British intelligence objectives during post-Independence India. Initially, intelligence operations centered around broad, collective goals, with the British using the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to track Soviet activity. This phase, marked by the presence of MI6 officials guiding intelligence flows, set a unique tone for India’s intelligence culture. However, R&AW’s establishment in 1968 signaled a shift, exemplified by its decisive role in the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, marking the agency’s early promise.

As turmoil intensified in Kashmir and insurgencies plagued Punjab, R&AW evolved, strategically expanding its network and taking measured offensive stances in the region. The establishment of CIT-X units, later dissolved under the I.K. Gujral government, showcased a brief era where R&AW experimented with more assertive methods. Yet, R&AW’s approach largely remained one of “soft neutralisation” — expanding its regional footprint through influence and exposure, rather than aggression. A notable instance was its operations in Bangladesh during the military regime of Ershad, a pro-Pakistan leader, where R&AW adeptly maneuvered to maintain influence without overtly hostile actions.

However, successive intelligence lapses — from Kargil in 1999 to the 26/11 Mumbai attacks — exposed the limitations of R&AW’s traditional, bureaucratically hampered framework. These incidents unveiled a pressing need for R&AW to shift towards a more dynamic, covertly offensive posture, altering the agency’s trajectory as it grappled with new-age threats.

From Limited Offensive to Over-the-Horizon Strikes

Post-2014, R&AW faced mounting pressure to redefine its strategies in alignment with evolving national security needs, largely influenced by the “Doval Doctrine,” a policy emphasising both defensive-offensive and offensive-defensive tactics. Under this approach, India’s external intelligence arm had to expand its limited offensive capacity, a shift fraught with the risk of exposure, especially in operations beyond the immediate neighbourhood. While R&AW did succeed in certain covert actions, the agency's cautious approach became evident, particularly under the leadership of former R&AW chief and current Additional NSA Rajinder Khanna. Reports indicate that Khanna was reluctant to undertake extended covert operations in complex environments, such as Iran, reflecting an internal struggle to match the doctrine’s ambitions with operational capability.

R&AW’s operational constraints were further exposed amid a shifting global threat landscape. The rise of low-cost terrorism through groups like ISIS, as seen in the 2015 Paris attacks, as well as the surge in cyber-narco terrorism, exposed the need for a strong response. With threats crisscrossing from African and Southeast Asian countries, fueling Islamic fundamentalism and cybercrime, India’s intelligence infrastructure found itself passing through a new era of multifaceted dangers. Ajit Doval, in a 2012 article for the Indian Police Journal, articulated a vision for "low-cost sustainable offensives" with “high deniability,” aiming to incrementally weaken adversaries while minimising traceability. This strategy became a cornerstone of R&AW's evolving posture.

Under the leadership of Samant Goel, known for his assertive and hawkish stance, R&AW expanded its operational bases significantly. According to Intelligence Online, Goel’s tenure marked the agency's readiness to adopt a “low-cost sustainable offensive” approach, demonstrated in high-stakes operations, including the alleged targeting of figures like LeT chief Hafiz Saeed within Pakistan. These “over-the-horizon” strikes, successful in nearby regions, hinted at R&AW’s readiness to extend its reach further. Yet, the challenge of executing such missions with the necessary “high deniability” exposed the ongoing complexities faced by India’s premier intelligence agency.

The Perils and Politics of R&AW’s Covert Reach

Under Samant Goel’s leadership, R&AW extended its covert reach, capitalising on an expanded network in Western and Latin American regions to address security threats posed by groups like the Khalistani separatists. A notable target was Khalistani leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun, based in the U.S., who had been attempting to rekindle political and military resistance against India. In Canada, the agency deployed low-cost, deniable tactics to disrupt the Khalistani network. However, R&AW’s expanded activities quickly attracted the attention of foreign intelligence agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and CIA, leading to diplomatic frictions with the United States.

This strain on India-U.S. relations escalated, allegedly affecting diplomatic operations. Reports suggest that the friction led to the delay of a new R&AW station chief’s appointment in Washington, D.C., while two officers stationed in Latin America were recalled. The situation intensified when the FBI disclosed the identity of R&AW officer Vikas Yadav, even placing him on a wanted list. Such measures hint at the U.S.'s strategic frustrations, likely intended as a signal not only to India but also to China, with whom it maintains a cautious dynamic.

The unfolding diplomatic fallout raises questions about R&AW’s readiness for over-the-horizon operations. The agency’s ambitions, though aligned with India’s evolving security needs, may have surpassed its current capacity for high-deniability strikes. For R&AW, recalibrating its covert strategy could be crucial, especially as it moves through complex international waters and competing intelligence networks on foreign soil.

Internal Hurdles and Diplomatic Setbacks for R&AW

The premature shift in R&AW's operational approach, from a collective intelligence model to overt offensive strategies, has revealed multiple fault lines within the agency. These flaws have not only led to operational missteps but have also strained India’s diplomatic relations. Former R&AW Special Secretary Vapalla Balachandran identifies the first major faultline as a lack of effective intelligence arbitration, coupled with an underutilisation of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). This oversight creates a critical gap in foresightedness, impacting R&AW's planning and operational outcomes. For instance, Balachandran points to the CIA's own miscalculation in Guyana, where a failure to consult open-source data and public sentiment led to an unsuccessful and costly election intervention. R&AW’s recent challenges, including a failed covert operation in the U.S., reveal the need for greater foresight and caution in operational planning.

A second major faultline within R&AW lies in its counterintelligence deficiencies, a longstanding vulnerability that has hampered operations in the past. The agency’s struggle with counterintelligence was notably highlighted during the Sri Lanka crisis when an operative was honey-trapped by the CIA, compromising R&AW's strategic stance on Sri Lanka and the LTTE. More recently, the Nikhil Gupta case echoed this weakness, where a failure to properly vet a supposed informant—later revealed to be a DEA official—led to a blown cover. Intelligence analysts argue that R&AW should adopt more stringent measures in its recruitment and vetting processes, mirroring the CIA's heightened caution after its “dirty sources” crisis of the 1990s. This renewed focus could help safeguard R&AW against foreign intelligence penetrations and avert further diplomatic entanglements.

The third faultline concerns the structural dominance of the Indian Police Services (IPS) within R&AW, which some critics argue undermines the agency’s specialised needs. An over-reliance on IPS officials, often with minimal training in intelligence tradecraft, has led to operational gaps. The case of a recent CRPF inductee, who reportedly made tactical errors after only a short training period, exposes the risks of this approach. Although R&AW has attempted to diversify its talent pool in the past, disciplinary issues and internal resistance have hindered these efforts. Reforming recruitment policies to allow a more specialised cadre within the Research and Analysis Service (RAS) could enhance R&AW’s analytical rigour and operational capabilities, fostering a culture of expertise better suited to the challenges of modern intelligence work.

Tradecraft Reality and R&AW’s Evolving Challenges

As global threats become more intricate, intelligence agencies worldwide are pressured to adapt rapidly. The reality of tradecraft is shifting, with deception and weaponisation reaching new heights each day, creating a complex threat matrix that demands a 360-degree upgrade in intelligence practices. R&AW is no exception. While the agency has made efforts to understand these evolving tradecraft demands, it faces a steep learning curve transitioning from its traditionally cautious, collective covert approach to more offensive tactics.

R&AW’s recent operation attempt in the U.S reveals this struggle. The endeavour was ambitious but ultimately miscalculated, revealing a gap in the agency’s readiness for high-stakes, offensive covert action. It’s crucial to recognise that even established agencies like the CIA have a history of operational errors. However, the CIA’s long-standing experience with offensive covert manoeuvres has allowed it to cultivate a resilient tradecraft culture, something R&AW is only beginning to navigate.

For R&AW, aligning with the demands of "covert transition" is no small feat. The agency must internally reform to build its capacity for successful offensive operations. Yet, the introduction of intelligence oversight—a reform debated for years—remains elusive in India, primarily due to the nation’s sensitive intelligence and political environment. Any substantive change in R&AW’s tradecraft approach must emerge organically, from within the intelligence community, adapting to both internal and global imperatives.