India-US Relations Strain Under Double Standards in Covert Actions

India-US relationship is currently navigating some challenges as the countries attempt to align their interests beyond political considerations. Recently, the U.S. highlighted India's alleged covert actions, sparking mild tensions between the two nations. The Washington Post published an article providing insights into an Indian covert operation that was thwarted by the U.S. security agencies. For the past few months, the U.S. has been pursuing this issue, alleging that India planned a covert operation to assassinate Khalistani leader Gurpatwant Singh Pannun. This pursuit reveals the double standards in U.S's strategic behaviour and has the potential to strain the otherwise strong India-US relationship.

However, two major questions must be addressed. First, why has the U.S. failed to maintain its strategic and security relationship with India, despite knowing that these areas form the strong foundation of India-US ties in today's global and regional politics? Second, what are the implications of India's attempt to expand its covert operations, and what are the reasonable consequences of such actions?

India-US Ties: US’s Half-Hearted Security Cooperation

The story of the U.S.'s half-hearted strategic assessments and support for New Delhi is not new. During the Cold War and even in the early 2000s, the U.S. remained skeptical of India's strategic behaviour in global and regional politics. The rise of China and India prompted the U.S. to shift its strategic focus in Asia, fostering deeper ties with India. However, the potential for half-hearted security cooperation and disagreements persisted. Despite India's numerous efforts to brief and convincingly demonstrate to the U.S. that the Khalistani presence in the U.S. poses a national security threat to India, these efforts have largely been in vain.

According to B. Raman, former Special Secretary of R&AW, during the rise of the Khalistani movement in the 1980s, the movement gained momentum from foreign soil, including the U.S. and Canada. The U.S.'s failure to recognise India's significant security needs stems from two primary reasons.

First, the West does not consider Sikh separatists to be a direct or indirect threat, despite the CIA's declassified 1987 memo recognising the Sikh separatist movement as a "long-term terrorism threat." This assessment emerged after the 1985 Air India bombing by Sikh separatists. Second, the political nurturing of the movement on Western soil allows Sikh separatists to operate freely under the guise of civil and political rights, particularly in Canada. The strong belief in democratic principles, encompassing political and civil rights, provides the Khalistan movement with a robust shield in Western countries, especially the U.S. and Canada.

The U.S.'s assessment is based on a fixed view of threat perceptions. U.S. counterterrorism and intelligence agencies place a "global compass" at the center of their global and regional terror map. This means the U.S. only concerns itself with any group if it becomes a global threat like LeT, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS. This perspective leads to a failure to recognise that counterterrorism assessments should be open and dynamic, where any regional outfit could gain greater strength. Subjectivity in designating and perceiving threats will cause significant failures and gaps in U.S's counterterrorism strategies in the near future.

According to the leading American journalist and historian Nick Turse, America’s Global War on Terror has faced stalemates, disasters, and outright defeats. The greatest failure of its "Forever Wars" may not be in the Middle East, but in Africa. America’s long-running, undeclared war in Somalia has become a key driver of violence in that country, according to the Costs of War Project. The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia but has become integral to its continuation. Similarly, Turse emphasises that military coups have exacerbated atrocities while undermining American aims, yet the U.S. continues to support such regimes with counterterrorism assistance. This illustrates that for the U.S., counterterrorism is a strategic game driven by its national security concerns rather than genuine concern for broader security demands.

India-US Ties Strained by Double Standards of Hot Pursuit

New Delhi’s resort to covert action to pursue terror networks operating on foreign soil is entirely justified. Every state needs to build systemic covert action capabilities to achieve greater national security goals and mitigate emerging threats.

For India, the development of covert action began in the late 1960s to mid-1970s, during the formative years of its external intelligence wing, R&AW. Initially, these covert actions were limited to political operations and were not effectively offensive until the mid-1990s. To counter dual threats from Kashmir and Khalistan, R&AW developed two counter-terror units, CIT-X and CIT-J, which pushed the idea of offensive covert action. However, the diplomatic vision of former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral abruptly halted CIT-X and CIT-J operations.

In 2016, the idea of "Ghar mai Ghus Ke Marenge" (We will enter their homes and kill them) emerged, and India’s offensive covert action capabilities were revived under the watch of former R&AW chief Samant Goel. This revival translated into a covert war against terror proxies and networks operating from foreign soils. The U.S.'s attempt to use counter-intelligence operations to expose R&AW through media highlights not only double standards but also risks undermining trust and intelligence cooperation between the two nations. The U.S. itself has engaged in covert actions abroad, from the Cold War to attempts to penetrate China’s security establishments.

The argument here is that the U.S. feels free to push its strategic interests, deter, and punish adversaries through covert means, but expects other states to refrain from similar actions in the name of "sovereignty and democracy." The CIA’s failures in overthrowing Fidel Castro, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion and the numerous failed assassination attempts on Castro, illustrate these double standards.

In 1975, the Senate Church Committee released a report titled "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," substantiating eight attempts by the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro between 1960-1965. The CIA’s long history of targeted killings, from aerial bombings of leaders like Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 1986, Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic in 1999, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein in 2003, reveals its use of covert means for national security without adhering to rules it imposes on others.

For the U.S., national security needs justify rule-breaking, but for others, compliance with democratic principles and respecting other states’ right to self-defence is expected. To maintain a strategic and security partnership with India and move beyond Cold War-era memories, the U.S. must end its double standards on counter-terrorism and security cooperation. Otherwise, India-US ties may continue to deteriorate, jeopardising the potential for a strong and mutually beneficial partnership in addressing global and regional security challenges.

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