Katchatheevu Island: Navigating Beyond Political Rhetoric

As the BJP strives to gain traction in the South with its new leader, Annamalai, an important geopolitical debate has surfaced in the past few days.This debate has the potential to influence both the internal and external dynamics of the country. It centers on the decision to give Katchatheevu Island to Sri Lanka in 1974 through an agreement. It's not just about who owns the island; it also affects the relationship between India and Sri Lanka including strategic interests of both sides. 

The History 

Katchatheevu Island, with 285 acres of land, was under the control of the Jaffna Kingdom during mediaeval times, and according to the Rameshwaram Inscription, Sri Lankan ruler King Nissanka Malla used to visit this island. Later, in the post-medieval period, specifically in the 17th century, the island became part of the Ramanath Kingdom, ruled by Rajas with the title of Sethupathis. Eventually, the kingdom became a district under the Madras Presidency in British India, thus making Katchatheevu Island a part of the Madras Presidency. In 1920, the British used this island for gunnery practices.

The dispute began when both states claimed ownership of the island, citing historical evidence. Sri Lanka asserted that the island was part of the Jaffna Kingdom and had even been occupied by the Portuguese. India asserted that the island was the last outpost of the Ramanath Kingdom, which later became part of the Madras Presidency. The dispute persisted until a breakthrough in 1974 when both states signed a maritime boundary agreement that included ceding the island to Colombo.

The 1974 and 1976 Agreement

The trigger for this agreement mainly came from geopolitical and national interests. Geopolitically, it aimed to improve relations with Sri Lanka. Secondly, it addressed the concerns of Indian fishermen and resource management. The agreement set boundaries, including historic waters, in the Palk Strait. 

Another agreement in 1976 outlined maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mannar. Alongside this, giving Katchatheevu Island to Sri Lanka was a goodwill gesture between the two countries. Despite its importance, the agreement's main significance lies in building trust between India and Sri Lanka. Article 5 allowed Indian fishermen to keep using the island for drying nets, fishing, and pilgrimage. However, it didn't mention "fishing" explicitly, causing issues in the Tamil Nadu fishing community and leading to Indian fishermen being arrested by Sri Lankan authorities. Reportedly, Sri Lanka detained around six thousand Indian fishermen in the last 20 years.

The 1976 agreement gave India control over the resource-rich Wadge Bank, allowing exploration of petroleum and minerals. However, it banned Indian fishermen from fishing in Sri Lankan waters. These agreements boosted confidence in Indo-Lankan relations, benefiting both countries in maritime matters. As former Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka, Ashok Kantha, said, "The 1974 agreement laid the foundation for subsequent accords, which were crucial for our relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives." However, looking back, these agreements also have flaws, affecting India’s political and geostrategic positioning both internally and externally.

A “Strategic” Compromise 

Handing over a strategically important island to Sri Lanka and receiving only minor benefits in return for managing resources and defining maritime boundaries was indeed not a favorable outcome. Indo-Lankan relations went through significant turmoil when Sri Lanka faced insurgency, and the Rajiv Gandhi-led government made the mistake of sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force into Sri Lanka. The trust and confidence gained in 1974 were eroded within a decade.

While Indira Gandhi’s decision may have had some tactical foresight, it lacked strategic vision. During that period, geopolitics was influenced by the Cold War, and there was a looming communist insurgency in Sri Lanka in 1971. Indira Gandhi aimed to keep Colombo from aligning too closely with China, hence she pursued this agreement and goodwill gesture to foster closer ties, assisting Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s government in maintaining stability. However, this decision was more of a tactical compromise rather than a strategic one, for several reasons.

• The island played a vital role in strategic operations within the Indian Ocean Region.
• Its proximity, being just 62 km from Jaffna, allowed New Delhi to monitor China’s economic activities in the Jaffna port, such as the Hybrid Wind Project.
• Situated a mere 10 nautical miles from Rameswaram, any Chinese involvement on the island posed a threat to India’s strategic maritime presence.
• The island was instrumental in monitoring China’s spying vessels.
• Strategically positioned, gaining control of the island would greatly diminish China’s influence.

Taking a long-term view, Indira Gandhi could have made a valid argument for retaining the island. Geopolitical realities are constantly evolving, and decisions have both direct and indirect impacts on national and strategic interests. Even the Tamil Nadu Government, under J. Jayalalitha's leadership, challenged this decision in the Supreme Court. They argued that the 1974 agreement was unconstitutional, as ceding territory would require a constitutional amendment in Parliament, which hadn't occurred in this case. However, the Indian government countered that since there was no territorial demarcation, the ceding was valid and didn't need an amendment. Nevertheless, the argument regarding the necessity of the island raises another issue, testing the relationship between India and Sri Lanka.

Testing Indo-Lankan Relationship 

Many noted diplomats like Shivshankar Menon and analysts have argued that India must not push this issue further, as it could escalate tensions in the Indo-Lankan relationship. A Sri Lankan minister has already stated, "India has no grounds on the island claim," raising fears of tensions. Former NSA Menon has termed this attempt a "self-goal".

These diplomats have further suggested that New Delhi must look at the wider picture of keeping China's influence at bay rather than fixating itself on a tiny island. This perspective gains weight because, as per United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), there is no unilateral withdrawal from the accord once notified under the convention. Former Attorney General Mukul Rohatgi says that to reclaim the island, "we would have to go to war with Sri Lanka."

However, it's essential to consider another perspective where challenging relations for reasonable strategic matters sometimes holds merit. In this instance, pursuing this approach requires diplomatic maturity. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has emphasised the importance of "finding a solution" to this issue. He states, "We should obtain fishing rights. We need to engage with Sri Lankan authorities and resolve this matter."

These former diplomats and analysts have made a mistake in their lengthy strategic evaluations when suggesting a "wider picture." India’s broader strategy in countering China's influence hinges on these small islands. China’s Two Ocean strategy aims to control both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, requiring a robust deterrent, which currently primarily exists in the Indo-Pacific region. To expand maritime deterrence, India needs to enhance its strategic presence through its Necklace Diamond strategy. This can be achieved by exerting influence over small islands, later utilising them for strategic operations in the Indian Ocean. India must understand that "presence" is crucial in deterring China. Unlike other islands, Katchatheevu Island is strategically located, providing India with a significant strategic advantage.

Regarding relations, diplomatic outreach and negotiations are crucial for reconsidering these agreements. Some resolution of the implications is necessary for India, whether concerning the fishermen's issue or the broader issue of reclaiming the island. This matter affects New Delhi on two fronts - domestically, with the fishermen's issue, and geopolitically, particularly concerning China.

The Hans Island peace agreement of 2022 serves as a useful reference point in this dispute. Canada and Denmark resolved their sovereignty claims over Hans Island through a sharing agreement, which could provide insights for this situation. However, implementing a similar solution here could be a challenging diplomatic task and might escalate tensions. Nonetheless, there are valuable lessons to be learned.

This issue isn't merely about ownership of a "tiny island"; it extends far beyond that. Fearing damage to relations shouldn't hinder addressing the matter, especially in today's heightened geopolitical contest globally. Flexibility and a strong focus on national interests are essential for navigating these challenges successfully. Therefore, revisiting past mistakes is crucial if there's an opportunity for correction. India has valid claims and stands to benefit at various levels from such a reevaluation. This revisit could ensure India’s alignment with long-term interests, both domestically and in future geopolitical contests in the Indian Ocean.

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