China's Tibet Agenda Puts India on Edge

China’s Tibet Gambit Exposes Gaps in India’s Strategy

The issue of the Dalai Lama’s succession has become a growing point of tension between India and China. Through China’s Tibet policy, Beijing has taken an aggressive stance on the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation process, while India’s response has remained largely symbolic. India’s current Tibet policy shows limited assertiveness and is bound by strategic constraints, which appear inadequate given the changing dynamics of Indo-China relations—particularly concerning Tibet. In light of this, New Delhi must re-evaluate its approach and make strategic adjustments to counter potential Chinese moves that, through China’s Tibet policy, could directly challenge India’s national interests.

India’s Early Engagement with Tibet

Tibet historically acted as a buffer region between India and China, sharing deep cultural and religious ties with India through Buddhism. The Simla Convention of 1914, negotiated between British India, Tibet, and a Chinese representative,aimed to define Tibet’s boundaries and status, including the McMahon Line. However, China refused to ratify the final agreement in 1914, rejecting its terms long before its occupation of Tibet in 1950. In1954, India’s Prime MinisterJawaharlal Nehru signed the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India (often called the Panchsheel Agreement), which implicitly recognised Tibet as part of China to foster peaceful relations withBeijing. This stance shifted in 1959 when India granted asylum to the 14th Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetan refugees following the Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule, leading to the establishment of the Central Tibetan Administration(CTA), commonly referred to as the Tibetan government-in-exile, in Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh.

The Evolving Policy

After formally recognising Tibet as part of China, India continued to reaffirm this position during Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit and again in 2003 during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing. India’s decision to downplay the Tibetan issue, despite the implications of China’s Tibet policy, was aimed at easing tensions in a relationship already strained by past wars and ongoing border disputes.

India’s policy of restraint on the Tibet issue began to shift subtly around 2010 toward strategic restraint, driven by China’s increasing assertiveness along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and disregard for India’s territorial claims, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. As a result, India ceased explicitly endorsing China’s One China policy in joint statements, adopting a more nuanced stance. However, India has consistently maintained its position of not officially recognising the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), also known as the Tibetan government-in-exile, in Dharamshala, treating it as a non-governmental organisation.

Symbolic Assertiveness

In 2014, India began to show symbolic assertiveness in response to China’s growing influence and aggressive posture along the Line of Actual Control. This shift was marked by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to the Central Tibetan Administration’s (CTA) head, Lobsang Sangay, to attend his swearing-in ceremony. The symbolic gestures continued in 2021 when Modi publicly wished the Dalai Lama on his birthday—an act that followed the heightened border tensions after the 2020 Galwan Valley clash.

In 2023, India continued its symbolic assertiveness in response to China’s actions, including Beijing’s renaming of 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, which India considers an integral part of its territory. While India did not officially announce plans to rename locations in Tibet that year, discussions and proposals for such a countermeasure emerged in 2024, reflecting India’s intent to challenge China’s nomenclature aggression. Additionally, in June 2023, India facilitated a visit by a U.S. congressional delegation to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamshala, which coincided with U.S. discussions on the Resolve Tibet Act. While India did not explicitly endorse the act, the visit signaled a subtle alignment with international attention on Tibet, reinforcing India’s strategic positioning.

Need for a Dynamic Shift in Tibet Policy

To effectively counter China’s Tibet policy, India must evolve beyond symbolic gestures. The current strategy serves more as a minor provocation than a meaningful deterrent, lacking the necessary weight to influence China’s actions. Symbolic moves do little to strengthen India’s leverage and instead risk undermining its credibility with the Tibetan community, who may view Indian support as politically expedient rather than principled. The Dalai Lama himself observed in his autobiography that U.S. support was largely motivated by anti-communism, not genuine concern for Tibetan autonomy—a sentiment that may also reflect the limited depth of India’s backing.

Strategically, India cannot afford to ignore the real risks that could emerge, particularly concerning the Dalai Lama’s succession. With a 3,500 km shared border—primarily across Sikkim, Ladakh, and Arunachal Pradesh—Tibet remains a crucial buffer zone. China’s Tibet policy and its superior deterrence and disruptive capabilities puts India at a disadvantage if Beijing decides to escalate the Tibet issue or block Indian involvement in the reincarnation process. This could leave New Delhi in a vulnerable position.

The urgency for a strategic overhaul has intensified following the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday on July 6, 2025, which brought the succession issue into sharp focus. On July 2, 2025, the Dalai Lama released a video statement asserting that only his Gaden Phodrang Trust holds authority to select his successor, explicitly rejecting Beijing’s claims to control the reincarnation process. China’s Foreign Ministry swiftly countered, insisting that the succession must adhere to Chinese laws and historical conventions, escalating tensions.

India’s response has been measured yet symbolic: Union Minister Kiren Rijiju, a Buddhist from Arunachal Pradesh, attended the birthday celebrations in Dharamshala and declared that China has no right to interfere, while the Ministry of External Affairs emphasised the Dalai Lama’s role as a revered spiritual leader. These developments underscore the need for India to move beyond symbolic gestures to a robust strategy that can counter China’s assertive moves on the succession.

If China manages to install its own successor to the Dalai Lama, it would mark a serious geopolitical loss for India’s regional influence and its historical connection with the Tibetan cause. Either possibility—the exclusion of India from the succession process or the successful Chinese appointment—would challenge India’s growing deterrence posture. The current policy does not offer a viable strategic counter to China’s Tibet strategy, especially amid rising tensions and Beijing’s active support for Pakistan.

India must recognise that China’s Tibet policy is already embedded within its broader proxy and deterrence framework. This shifting landscape presents an urgent opportunity for India to reassess its Tibet strategy, adopt realistic and sustainable policy elements, and enhance its deterrence value on the global stage.

Re-shaping India’s Tibet Strategy Against China

India must integrate elements of sustainable and strategic disruption—both overt and covert—into its Tibet policy to counter China’s Tibet policy and its expanding influence in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and apply pressure at the global level. This approach should involve calibrated, long-term strategies that undermine China’s political and ideological hold over Tibet while reinforcing India’s geopolitical stance.

On the covert front, India has historical precedent. From 1957 to 1969, India’s Intelligence Bureau, prior to the establishment of R&AW, supported a CIA-led operation codenamed Operation Circus. This initiative trained Tibetan insurgents for guerrilla warfare, with India facilitating their movement and logistics. The creation of the Special Frontier Force (SFF), a unit composed of Tibetan fighters under Indian command, was a direct result. This force assisted in intelligence operations, including tapping Chinese communication lines for the CIA, although with limited success. Fast forward to 2020, during the Galwan clash, this unit—now renamed Establishment 22 and functioning under R&AW—played a crucial role in intelligence-gathering operations against China.

Building on this operational history, R&AW can implement limited psychological operations aimed at disrupting China’s political influence in Tibet. As declassified CIA documents from 2012 indicate, India once sent monks into Lhasa to foster anti-China sentiment and even plotted the assassination of Wu Jinghua, the then-Party Secretary of Tibet. Psychological disruption of this nature could deter China from advancing its political agenda in Tibet, particularly concerning the succession of the Dalai Lama.

The 2008 Tibetan unrest is a key example of the disruptive potential of such operations. In April of that year, mass protests erupted across the Tibetan plateau, commemorating the 49th anniversary of the 1959 uprising and opposing Chinese repression. The protests, which spread rapidly, led to violence, destruction of property, and civilian casualties. Though China responded with a heavy crackdown, the global impact was significant—sparking international protests, including in India and Europe, and prompting the U.S. State Department to issue a travel warning for the Beijing Olympics. While the Olympics were held as scheduled, the unrest tarnished China's image on the world stage.

India can replicate such covert mechanisms to destabilise China’s Tibet policy and its growing grip over Tibet. Though tactical in nature, these measures can leave a long-term psychological imprint on the Tibetan population and disrupt China’s succession plans.

On the overt side, India should look to strengthen its strategic partnership with the United States, particularly through support for the U.S. Tibet Act. This could serve as a platform to internationalise the Tibet issue, drawing global attention to China’s human rights violations and political maneuvering in the region. Deeper Indo-U.S. coordination on Tibet would also enhance diplomatic leverage against China. Simultaneously, India could revise its 2014 Tibetan refugee policy to adopt a more inclusive and supportive stance, signaling deeper commitment to the Tibetan cause.

However, India must tread carefully in this overt approach. Over-alignment with the United States may disrupt the regional power balance and heighten the risk of direct confrontation with China. Therefore, the overt-covert strategy must be executed with precision.

This recalibrated Tibet strategy does face several challenges. First, any aggressive Indian response may provoke Chinese retaliation along the eastern front. Second, China’s enhanced surveillance and propaganda in Tibet have swayed segments of the Tibetan elite into accepting Beijing’s authority, making grassroots disruption more complex. A complete policy overhaul will not be easy, but with well-defined operational goals and strategic diplomatic engagement, it is feasible.

India must aim for limited, high-impact actions rather than broad, unfocused responses. With Indo-China tensions over Tibet likely to intensify in the near future, New Delhi can no longer afford to maintain a passive or symbolic stance.